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Abstract
We review methodological questions relevant for the design of information provision
experiments. We first provide a literature review of major areas in which information
provision experiments are applied. We then outline key measurement challenges and
design recommendations that may be of help for practitioners planning to conduct an
information experiment. We discuss the measurement of subjective beliefs, including the
role of incentives and ways to reduce measurement error. We also discuss the design of
the information intervention, as well as the measurement of belief updating. Moreover,
we describe ways to mitigate potential experimenter demand effects and numerical
anchoring arising from the information treatment. Finally, we discuss typical effect sizes
in information experiments.
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1 Motivation
Standard economic theories usually understand choices as a combination of four factors:
preferences, constraints, information, and beliefs. The goal of economic experiments is
typically to change some features of the choice environment to study how choices are
made. Information experiments achieve this by varying the information set available to
economic agents. By only providing information to a random subset of the population of
interest, information experiments have become a popular method to study how economic
agents form beliefs and make choices. For instance, information experiments have been
extensively used to study policy questions (Alesina et al., 2018c; Armantier et al., 2016;
Coibion et al., 2020a, 2019b; Hjort et al., 2019) and test economic theories (Bursztyn et al.,
2012, 2019a). They can be conducted in controlled lab settings, online, or in more natural
settings where the population of interest is typically not aware of its participation in an
experiment.
Information experiments enable clean identification of the questions of interest by only
varying one feature of the information set. One very powerful application of information
experiments is to generate exogenous variation in perceptions of real world environments,
which themselves cannot be directly changed. For instance, it is impossible to change the
characteristics of immigrants, but researchers can vary perceptions of the immigrant popu-
lation by correcting people’s misperceptions (Grigorieff et al., 2020). Similarly, researchers
cannot manipulate intergenerational mobility or influence the state of the macroeconomy,
but it is possible to change perceptions of intergenerational mobility (Alesina et al., 2018c)
or the perceived likelihood of a recession (Roth and Wohlfart, 2019). Finally, researchers
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cannot manipulate social norms, but information provision experiments can be used to
study the causal effect of perceived social norms on behavior (Bursztyn et al., 2018).
In this article, we review the growing literature on information experiments in eco-
nomics. In Section 2, we summarize areas in which information experiments have been
widely applied. In Section 3, we outline best-practice recommendations for the measure-
ment of beliefs. In Section 4, we discuss the design of the information intervention. In
Section 5, we outline important aspects of the measurement of belief updating. In Section 6,
we discuss best practice recommendations for mitigating concerns about experimenter
demand effects. In Section 7, we discuss online samples that are commonly used for
information provision experiments. In Section 8, we discuss typical effect sizes and rec-
ommendations for sample sizes in information provision experiments. Finally, we offer
concluding remarks in Section 9.
2 Major applications
In this section we provide an overview of areas in economics in which information pro-
vision experiments have been widely applied. This review is necessarily incomplete,
and focuses on applications in public economics, political economy, macroeconomics and
household finance, and labor economics.1
1Our review does not include information provision experiments operating in a laboratory setting in
which respondents receive information about features of the laboratory environment or the behavior of other
participants in the lab. The review also does not feature work studying the role of the media in shaping
beliefs and behavior.
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Public Economics Information provision experiments are used in many areas of public
economics. Chetty and Saez (2013) conduct an experiment with 43,000 EITC recipients
in which a random subset received personalized information about the EITC schedule.
Doerrenberg and Peichl (2018) examine how social norms affect tax morale, and Blesse
et al. (2019) study how beliefs shape preferences for tax simplification. Bérgolo et al.
(2017) and Doerrenberg and Schmitz (2015) examine how firms respond to information
about audit probabilities, and Bott et al. (2019) study whether people’s tendency to evade
taxes responds to information about detection probability and moral appeals. Similarly,
Perez-Truglia and Troiano (2018) examine how information on financial penalties, shaming
penalties, and peer comparisons shape tax delinquents’ future repayment rates. De Neve
et al. (2019) study the impact of deterrence, tax morale, and simplifying information on
tax compliance. Finally, a literature in behavioral public economics has studied how
misperceptions about the fuel economy affect consumers’ purchasing decisions (Allcott,
2013; Allcott and Knittel, 2019; Allcott and Taubinsky, 2015).
Political Economy Information experiments are also commonly used to study how
beliefs affect policy attitudes, such as people’s demand for redistribution (Alesina et al.,
2018c; Chen et al., 2016; Cruces et al., 2013; Fehr et al., 2019a,b; Gärtner et al., 2019; Karadja
et al., 2017; Kuziemko et al., 2015), their support for government spending (Lergetporer
et al., 2018a; Roth et al., 2019), their views on educational inequality (Lergetporer et al.,
2018c) and tuition fees (Lergetporer et al., 2016), their support for immigration (Alesina et
al., 2018a; Bansak et al., 2016; Barrera et al., 2020; Facchini et al., 2016; Grigorieff et al., 2020;
Haaland and Roth, 2019b; Hopkins et al., 2019; Lergetporer et al., 2017), their tendency
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to discriminate against immigrants (Alesina et al., 2018b), or their support for affirmative
action (Haaland and Roth, 2019a; Settele, 2019). In the context of the coronavirus pandemic,
Settele and Shupe (2020) study the role of beliefs for supporting lockdown measures, and
Rafkin et al. (2020) study determinants of inference from official government projections.
Information experiments are also conducted to better understand the demand for news
and the implications of media on behavior. Chopra et al. (2019) study how perceived
informativeness affects people’s demand for economic and political news. Bursztyn et
al. (2020b) study how the common knowledge of rationales (which are usually supplied
by the media) affects the public expression of xenophobia through the lens of a signaling
model.
In the context of natural field experiments, researchers have used information treat-
ments to study voting behavior (Cruz et al., 2017, 2018; Kendall et al., 2015; Orkin, 2019)
or to study strategic behavior of political activists (Hager et al., 2019a,b) and protesters
(Cantoni et al., 2019; Hager et al., 2019c). Finally, researchers have studied whether infor-
mation about improved public services can help build trust in state institutions and move
people away from non-state actors in Pakistan (Acemoglu et al., 2019), and showed that, in
the context of social service program delivery, mailing cards with program information to
targeted beneficiaries increases the subsidy they receive from a subsidized rice program
(Banerjee et al., 2018).
Macroeconomics Information provision experiments are widely used in macroeconomics
to study expectation formation of households and firms in the context of beliefs about
inflation (Armantier et al., 2016; Binder and Rodrigue, 2018; Cavallo et al., 2016a; Coibion et
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al., 2019a, 2020a, 2019b,c, 2018a), house prices (Armona et al., 2019; Fuster et al., 2018; Qian,
2019), recessions (Roth and Wohlfart, 2019), and exposure to macroeconomic risk (Roth
et al., 2020). In the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, Coibion et al. (2020b) study how
provision of information about policy responses shapes households’ macroeconomic ex-
pectations and spending plans. Binder (2020) provides evidence on the effect of providing
Fed communication about its coronavirus response on household expectations.
Household Finance Research in household finance has studied the effects of informa-
tion provision on retirement savings (Beshears et al., 2015; Dolls et al., 2018). Moreover,
Bursztyn et al. (2019b) examine how moral appeals affect debt repayment. Bursztyn et al.
(2012) study the mechanisms underlying peer effects in financial decisions. Bottan and
Perez-Truglia (2020) study the causal effect of home price expectations on the timing of
home sales using a large-scale field experiment, featuring administrative data. Laudenbach
et al. (2020) use an information experiment to study the causal effect of subjective beliefs
about the stock market and stock returns on investment choices. In the context of the
coronavirus pandemic, Hanspal et al. (2020) provide experimental evidence that beliefs
about the duration of the stock market recovery shape households’ expectations about
their own wealth and their planned investment decisions and labor market activity.
Labor, education and health economics Information provision experiments have been
applied to study job search (Abebe et al., 2020; Altmann et al., 2018; Belot et al., 2018a,b;
Carranza et al., 2019; Franklin, 2017), social norms (Bursztyn et al., 2018), educational
aspirations (Lergetporer et al., 2018b), schooling decisions (Jensen, 2010), major choice
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(Bleemer and Zafar, 2018; Conlon, 2019; Wiswall and Zafar, 2014) as well as school choice
(Andrabi et al., 2017). Researchers have shown that information about school quality
affects parental investment decisions (Greaves et al., 2019) and that parents’ beliefs about
children’s ability affect their educational investments (Dizon-Ross, 2019). Coffman et al.
(2017) highlight that information about peers’ choices can affect job choice. Researchers
in behavioral labor economics have also studied how information provision about peers
affects people’s work morale and labor market behavior (Card et al., 2012; Cullen and
Perez-Truglia, 2018). In agricultural economics, information provision experiments are
also widely applied, for example, Hanna et al. (2014) study the effects of information on
farmers’ behavior.
Finally, information provision experiments have been used to study information rele-
vant for health behaviors. For example, Nyhan and Reifler (2015) and Nyhan et al. (2014)
study the effects of information about vaccines. Fitzsimons et al. (2016) find that inforna-
tion provision to mothers in Malawi increases children’s food consumption. Carneiro et
al. (2019) study an intervention targeting early life nutrition, which also provides nutri-
tional information. Dupas (2011) studies the effect of HIV information on sexual behavior.
Kerwin (2018) examines how information about HIV risks affects sexual behaviors, Barari
et al. (2020) study public health messaging and social distancing in the context of the
coronavirus pandemic, while Fetzer et al. (2020) study perceptions of the pandemic risk
factors.
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3 Measuring Beliefs
Information provision experiments aim to study the effect of information on people’s
beliefs or to generate exogenous variation in beliefs to study the effect of beliefs on other
outcomes. This section discusses whether one should measure prior beliefs before the
information and posterior beliefs after the information, as well as issues related to the
measurement of beliefs, including advantages and disadvantages of measuring qualitative
or quantitative point beliefs versus probabilistic beliefs, the use of external benchmarks for
the elicitation of beliefs, the framing of belief elicitations and techniques on how to deal
with measurement error. Finally, we review the measurement of beliefs using hypothetical
vignettes.
3.1 Eliciting prior and posterior beliefs?
There are several advantages to eliciting prior beliefs in information provision experiments.
First, in designs with a pure control group (that is, a control group that does not receive any
information), the expected directional response to the treatment depends on people’s prior
beliefs about the information. Second, to interpret effect sizes and examine mechanisms, it
is important to measure the extent to which people update from the information.
Eliciting posterior beliefs is important in settings where there is a direct interest in
studying the effect of information on these beliefs. Moreover, measuring posterior beliefs
is necessary to learn about the size of the first stage in settings where information provision
experiments are used to study the causal effect of beliefs on other outcomes. In settings
where respondents are provided with information about facts (e.g., Roth et al., 2019),
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eliciting posteriors primarily serves to measure attention to the information, and is less
strictly needed than in designs where respondents receive a potentially noisy signal
about a variable (e.g., Roth and Wohlfart, 2019), where posteriors are used to assess how
informative respondents find the provided signal.
A potential downside of designs measuring both priors and posteriors is that such
within-designs potentially lead to stronger experimenter demand effects (see Section 6).
Alternatively, respondents may be subject to consistency bias in their survey responses
(Falk and Zimmermann, 2012), leading to a muted effect of information in within-designs.
However, Roth and Wohlfart (2019) do not find any significant effect of eliciting priors on
the estimated average learning rate in the context of information about macroeconomic
risk. Moreover, in designs with a pure control group, being asked the same question twice
might confuse respondents in the control group. One remedy is to use a different elicitation
mode for the posteriors compared to the priors (Coibion et al., 2019b).
3.2 Qualitative, quantitative or probabilistic beliefs?
How exactly should one measure beliefs? Should one measure beliefs using qualitative
or quantitative survey questions? Should one measure point estimates on quantities or
probabilistic beliefs in which people attach probabilities to different states of the world
occurring?
Qualitative beliefs: verbal response scales One way to measure beliefs is to present
respondents with verbal response scales, e.g. reaching from “very low” to “very high”,
or from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. Such belief measures have the simple
8
advantage that the response options are easy to understand for respondents, but the clear
disadvantage that they are not easily interpersonally comparable, which can result in severe
identification challenges (Bond and Lang, 2019). For instance, in the context of measuring
beliefs about the size of the immigration population, people might hold systematically
different views on whether a given fraction of immigrants in the population is “very low”
or “very high.” That is, if respondents interpret the verbal answer options differently,
making comparisons across individuals is challenging. Moreover, verbal response scales
are relatively crude and therefore limit the extent of information that can be conveyed
(Manski, 2018). Furthermore, with qualitative beliefs, it is often theoretically ambiguous in
which direction people should update their beliefs in response to an information treatment.
For instance, to manipulate perceptions about the size of the immigration population in the
United States, one could inform treated respondents that 12 percent of the US population
are immigrants (Grigorieff et al., 2020; Hopkins et al., 2019). Without a quantitative pre-
treatment beliefs measure, it is not clear whether treated respondents should revise their
beliefs about the size of the immigration population upwards or downwards in response
to this information.
Qualitative beliefs: open-ended questions It is also possible to use open-ended ques-
tions to measure beliefs (Bursztyn et al., 2020b; Stantcheva, 2020). The key advantage of
such open-ended questions is that respondents are not primed by the available answer
categories. In other words, open-ended questions enable researchers to directly measure
what “comes to mind”. For example, Stantcheva (2020) examines what considerations
people have in mind when thinking about a given policy. Bursztyn et al. (2020b) use such
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an open-ended elicitation to study inference about the motives for xenophobic expression.
Using a pre-registered text analysis procedure and handcoding of the qualitative responses
by research assistants, they use this data for studying inference. They validate their open-
ended question with a structured belief measure and establish strong correlations. In the
context of macroeconomic expectation formation, Leiser and Drori (2005) and D’Acunto et
al. (2019) study people’s associations with inflation using open-ended text questions.
Quantitative point beliefs Quantitative point beliefs have the advantage of interper-
sonal comparability, but they do not allow for individuals to express their uncertainty
about outcomes. It is therefore good practice to add a second qualitative question on
how sure or confident people were in their previous answer. A second disadvantage
of point beliefs is that it is unclear which moment of their subjective belief distribution
over potential future outcomes respondents report. While researchers often implicitly or
explicitly interpret point beliefs as the mean over the respondent’s subjective distribution,
respondents may report other moments such as their median or mode belief.2 Furthermore,
if beliefs are elicited with monetary incentives, people might rationally submit their beliefs
about the mode rather than their beliefs about the average. Lastly, people’s point beliefs
might be sensitive to question framing (Eriksson and Simpson, 2012).
Probablistic beliefs In probabilistic belief elicitation, respondents state probabilities for
the occurrence of different mutually exclusive events. Such probabilistic elicitations have
2For instance, De Bruin et al. (2011) show that survey respondents’ point forecasts about future inflation or
future wage growth are not consistently associated with means constructed from individual-level subjective
probability distributions over future inflation or wage growth, but are often associated with the median or
other moments of respondents’ reported distribution.
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the advantage that there is a well-defined absolute numerical scale that is interpersonally
and intrapersonally comparable (Manski, 2018). Probabilistic elicitations were pioneered by
Manski (2004) and have been widely and successfully applied in some areas in economics,
such as labor economics, and the economics of education in particular (Attanasio et al., 2019;
Boneva and Rauh, 2017; Boneva et al., 2019; Wiswall and Zafar, 2016, 2017). These measures
allow researchers to directly compute a measure of uncertainty as well as the mode and
the mean. More recently, the direct measurement of uncertainty has received additional
attention in the context of abstract choice and updating tasks as well as survey expectations
(Enke and Graeber, 2019). Enke and Graeber (2019) propose the measurement of cognitive
uncertainty and show that when people are cognitively uncertain, they implicitly compress
probabilities towards a cognitive default of 50:50 in binary state spaces.
One drawback of probabilistic scales is that a large fraction of the population has
difficulties in understanding and interpreting probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
A second drawback is that people’s stated beliefs are typically influenced by how the
outcomes are categorized (Benjamin et al., 2017). A third drawback is that probabilistic
questions are more time-consuming and taxing for respondents, which makes the ex-
periment longer and potentially induces higher attrition or a higher fraction of missing
responses. Some survey providers might also object to the use of probabilistic questions as
they might confuse respondents. Probabilistic elicitations are thus primarily recommended
in settings where it is very important to precisely quantify people’s uncertainty, especially
when the population of interest is relatively numerate.
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3.3 Benchmarks
One approach measures beliefs about objects of interest for which there is an objective
external benchmark. For instance, in the context of income inequality, one can elicit beliefs
about the income share going to the top 1 percent income earners rather than a general
question about whether income inequality is “high” or “low.” Measuring subjective
beliefs about quantities with well-defined benchmarks has several advantages. First,
by eliciting beliefs about a well-defined benchmark the experimenter fixes beliefs about
the environment and imposes additional structure on the responses. This in turn may
lower heterogeneity in how the question is interpreted and thereby reduce measurement
error and make responses across participants more comparable. Second, it allows to
characterize the extent of biases in beliefs compared to the benchmark. Third, it enables
one to incentivize the belief elicitations in a transparent way. Fourth, the availability of
benchmarks allows for the provision of information treatments that are tightly connected
with the belief elicitation. Recent applications of belief elicitations reliant on benchmarks
are studies on social norm elicitations (Krupka and Weber, 2013), racial discrimination
(Haaland and Roth, 2019a), intergenerational mobility (Alesina et al., 2018c), immigration
(Alesina et al., 2018a; Grigorieff et al., 2020; Haaland and Roth, 2019b), or infectious disease
spread (Fetzer et al., 2020).
3.4 Framing of belief elicitations
In settings in which respondents are relatively experienced they are capable of accurately
assessing economic quantities. For example, respondents are relatively good at assessing
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the price of gas (Ansolabehere et al., 2013). However, in settings in which respondents
are relatively unfamiliar, there will be higher levels of measurement error especially
when respondents are unsure about the response scale, for example in the context of
unemployment estimates. However, careful framing of questions can reduce measurement
error. For example, the provision of anchors which convey information about the response
scale can reduce measurement error (Ansolabehere et al., 2013). For instance, Roth et al.
(2019) measure beliefs about the debt-to-GDP ratio in the US using different historical or
cross-country anchors, and show that the provision of an anchor reduces the dispersion of
beliefs and rounding.
3.5 Multiple measurement
Many belief elicitations pose respondents difficult questions. The cognitive strain in turn
may induce measurement error. How can researchers mitigate the extent of measurement
error? Gillen et al. (2019) propose an IV approach, which leverages multiple measurements
to deal with classical measurement error. We believe that this is particularly important in
the context of (quantitative) belief measurement. When reducing classical measurement
error is important, researchers ideally should measure their belief of interest using (i)
a qualitative survey question, (ii) a quantitative point estimate, and (iii) a probabilistic
question in which respondents attach probabilities to mutually exclusive states of the
world. This multiple measurement in turn can be leveraged to employ the IV methods
that help to deal with measurement error (Gillen et al., 2019). For instance, Giglio et
al. (2020) apply such an IV approach in the context of survey expectations about stock
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returns, using both point beliefs and subjective probability distributions. However, since
multiple measurements might be cognitively taxing for respondents, their benefits must be
weighed against the risk of increasing survey fatigue or higher attrition rates. Moreover,
this approach cannot be used in the case of non-classical measurement error.
3.6 Incentives
Do prediction incentives lower measurement error in belief elicitations? There is little
systematic evidence on the relevance of prediction incentives in the elicitation of beliefs.
In the context of economic beliefs, incentives have been shown to reduce partisan bias
in people’s stated beliefs about economics and politics (Bullock et al., 2015; Prior et al.,
2015). For example, the partisan gap in beliefs about the current unemployment rate
shrinks when respondents receive prediction incentives. Relatedly, Settele (2019) shows
that gender differences in reported beliefs about the gender wage gap shrink in the
presence of incentives. In the context of macroeconomic forecasting, it has been shown
that unincentivized survey reports strongly correlate with incentivized belief measures
(Armantier et al., 2015), and that incentives do not have any statistically significant effects
on reported beliefs (Roth and Wohlfart, 2019). Finally, Grewenig et al. (2020) provide mixed
evidence on the relevance of incentives in shaping accuracy. Their evidence highlights
that incentives have similar effects as a prompt to google the statistic of interest. This
highlights the potential undesirable side-effects of incentives when the information of
interest is publicly available. Taken together, incentives seem to have little effect on beliefs
in non-political domains and in which the responses cannot be easily googled. Danz et al.
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(2020) provide evidence that incentives can actually lower truth-telling in the context of
abstract prediction tasks. This further underscores the potential negative side-effects of
incentives.
3.7 Hypothetical vignettes
Another approach to measuring beliefs is to ask respondents to make predictions about an
outcome under different hypothetical scenarios. The use of such hypothetical vignettes is
an increasingly popular approach to measure beliefs in contexts that are difficult to study
in a real-world setting, such as in the context of education and human capital (Attanasio et
al., 2019; Boneva and Rauh, 2017, 2018; Delavande and Zafar, 2018; Kiessling, 2019; Wiswall
and Zafar, 2017), preferences over wealth taxation (Fisman et al., 2017), and in the context
of beliefs about the effects of macroeconomic shocks (Andre et al., 2019). Hypothetical
vignettes, also referred to as conjoint experiments, are widely used to study preferences
over different types of immigration (Bansak et al., 2016; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014;
Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). Hainmueller et al. (2015) show that the responses in the
vignettes are highly predictive of real world behaviors.
Hypothetical vignettes have the advantage of allowing the researcher more control
over the context specified to respondents. Potential disadvantages of hypothetical vi-
gnettes include that the hypothetical nature may lower respondents’ effort or induce
experimenter demand effects. Finally, it may be cognitively challenging for respondents
to think in hypotheticals, which could in turn increase measurement error and reduce
external validity.
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4 Designing the information intervention
In this section, we discuss issues related to the design of the information intervention.
First, we discuss different types of information that have been provided in prior work.
Second, we discuss which sources of information are commonly used. Third, we review
issues related to the presentation of the information. Fourth, we discuss ways through
which researchers can more credibly identify the effects of information rather than the
effects of priming individuals on an issue. Finally, we review commonly used methods
that employ probabilistic information treatments.
4.1 Types of information
Quantitative information Many survey experiments provide respondents with quantita-
tive information, such as statistics based on official census data (Bottan and Perez-Truglia,
2017; Grigorieff et al., 2020; Kuziemko et al., 2015; Roth et al., 2020) or forecasts about the
future of the economy (Armantier et al., 2016; Coibion et al., 2019b; Roth and Wohlfart,
2019). While quantitative information may be hard to understand for a large fraction
of the population, it often facilitates the interpretation of experimental findings in the
context of a theoretical framework. Moreover, together with elicited priors and posteriors
numerical information allows for the calculation of learning rates (see section 8). Many
times researchers provide statistical information about the behavior of others (Allcott, 2011;
Coffman et al., 2017; Duflo and Saez, 2003). A commonly used strategy provides a random
subset of respondents with information about others’ effort choices (Cantoni et al., 2019;
Hager et al., 2019a,b) or others’ beliefs, preferences and actions (Bursztyn et al., 2018, 2019a;
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Coibion et al., 2018a).
Anecdotal evidence, stories, and narratives Another highly relevant and important, but
different type of information relies on qualitative anecdotes, stories or narratives.3 This
information is not based on statistics, but instead provides qualitative information which
closely resembles case studies. Experiments systematically studying the role of stories,
anecdotal evidence and narratives are still very scarce, and we believe a fruitful area for
future research. Anecdotal information can also be communicated via pictures and videos,
which may be more effective in conveying information. A literature in development
economics has studied how inspirational videos change people’s beliefs and economic
behavior (Bernard et al., 2014; Riley, 2017).4
4.2 Sources of information
In this section we discuss a series of possible sources for information that prior research has
used to exogenously vary respondents’ beliefs and expectations. Researchers commonly
provide respondents with official government statistics (for instance, about the unemploy-
ment rate of immigrants (Grigorieff et al., 2020)), research evidence (for instance, about
the labor market effects of immigration (Haaland and Roth, 2019b), racial discrimination
(Haaland and Roth, 2019a), or intergenerational mobility (Alesina et al., 2018c)). In the
context of forward-looking expectations, one method to exogenously vary expectations
is the provision of expert forecasts. In the context of macroeconomic forecasts, Roth and
3Bénabou et al. (2018) study the role of narratives from a theoretical perspective.
4This is also related to a literature studying how the media affects people’s beliefs and their behavior
(Banerjee et al., 2019; Bursztyn et al., 2020a, 2017; DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; La Ferrara et al., 2012;
Martinez-Bravo and Stegmann, 2017; Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014).
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Wohlfart (2019) provide respondents with different forecasts about the likelihood of a
recession and Hager et al. (2019c) provide different expert forecasts about the anticipated
turnout to different protests. In experiments which aim to change perceptions of social
norms, researchers provide respondents with information about the views of respondents
as measured in other surveys (Bursztyn et al., 2018). Moreover, researchers have also
explored the effects of randomly providing news articles or statements from policymakers
on people’s beliefs and expectations (Coibion et al., 2019b). In general, it is important to
consider how credible respondents find the source of information.
It is possible that recipients of information think that the information source is biased,
for example, Republicans thinking that the BLS statistics were biased during the Obama era.
In that case people will update but taking the perceived bias into account (Cavallo et al.,
2016b). For an application of this idea in the context of inflation expectations in Argentina,
see Cavallo et al. (2016b). As another example, Jacobsen (2019) provides evidence on how
different sources differentially affect belief updating and policy views. It is good practice
to include direct questions on how credible and accurate people found the provided
information at the end of the survey.
4.3 Presentation of the information
How should researchers present the information in order to maximize the effectiveness of
the information intervention? To minimize concerns about demand effects, the treatment
should ideally be short and neutrally framed. At the same time, to generate a successful
first stage on beliefs, it is important to present the information in a way that maximizes
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understanding among respondents. One way to increase the understanding of the treat-
ment message is to supplement the text with a graphical illustration of the information. In
designs in which researchers elicit prior beliefs, an intuitive way of presenting the infor-
mation graphically contrasts prior beliefs with the value from the information treatment
(e.g. see Roth and Wohlfart (2019)).
4.4 Priming versus information
One key challenge in information experiments is to disentangle the effects of priming
from genuine belief updating.5 Common methods to mitigate concerns about priming
include (i) eliciting prior beliefs of respondents in both the treatment and control group, (ii)
separate the information provision from the main outcomes with follow-up studies, and
(iii) to include an active control group (that is, the control group also receives (differential)
information). The first approach guarantees that both respondents in the treatment and
the control group are primed on the issue of interest. The second approach ensures that
any short-lived priming effects are no longer relevant when the main outcomes are elicited.
The third approach ensures that respondents across all conditions receive information on
the issue of interest, but the information differs in terms of its content. In the following,
we discuss the use of active control groups in more depth.
Active versus passive control Many information provision experiments measure prior
beliefs on an issue and then provide the treatment group with information on that issue,
while a pure control group receives no information at all. An alternative design would
5For an excellent review on priming in economics, see Cohn and Maréchal (2016).
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measure prior beliefs and then provide the treatment and control group with different
information (this approach of using an active control group was pioneered by Bottan and
Perez-Truglia (2017); for other recent examples of papers implementing active control
groups in information provision experiments, see Hager et al. (2019c); Roth and Wohlfart
(2019); Roth et al. (2020); Settele (2019)).
Providing the control group with information has several advantages for studying
the causal effect of expectations on behavior. In a design with a pure control group the
variation hinges on prior beliefs. The identification mostly comes from individuals with
larger misperceptions ex ante. An active control group design generates variation in the
relevant belief also among individuals with more accurate priors and therefore identifies
average causal effects of beliefs on outcomes for a broader population. Moreover, receiving
an information treatment may have side effects, such as uncertainty reduction, attention,
and emotional responses (especially in designs where respondents have been corrected).
Such side effects should arguably be constant across groups that receive different pieces
of information. Finally, since prior beliefs may be measured with error and correlated
with both observables and unobservables, causal identification and the interpretation of
heterogeneous treatment effects are more difficult in designs with a pure control group.
There are also some advantages to having a pure control group. First, having a pure
control group makes it easier to interpret correlations between the pre-treatment beliefs
and the outcome of interest as beliefs among control group respondents are not affected
by the treatment. Second, sometimes the policy relevant question of interest is concerned
with the effect of providing a particular piece of information compared to not providing
this information. See a discussion of these issues in Roth and Wohlfart (2019) in the context
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of experiments on macroeconomic expectations or in Hager et al. (2019c) in the context of
strategic interactions in political movements. Furthermore, sometimes it is not possible to
have an active control group without deceiving respondents, in which case it is better to
have a pure control group or employ a probabilistic design as discussed below.
4.5 Probabilistic information treatments
Researchers have started to use probabilistic information treatments to compare belief
updating to Bayesian benchmarks (Eil and Rao, 2011; Mobius et al., 2015; Thaler, 2019;
Zimmermann, 2019). In probabilistic information treatments, respondents are told that
with a probability p they will learn the truth about a fact, and with (1 − p) they will
learn the opposite of the truth. Employing probabilistic information treatments provides
researchers with fully exogenous variation in beliefs in settings where only one piece
of truthful information about a benchmark is available and otherwise one would have
to revert to a design with one treatment group and a control group. It also provides
researchers with a Bayesian benchmark for the belief updating. However, it introduces
motivated beliefs into the updating process, which could in turn lower the effectiveness of
the information treatment (Eil and Rao, 2011; Mobius et al., 2015; Thaler, 2019). Probabilistic
information treatments are usually applied to study motivated reasoning in belief updating,
rather than studying causal effects of information and beliefs on behaviors. A downside
of probabilistic information treatments is that they are more artificial and less natural for
respondents.
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5 Measuring belief updating
In order to understand the mechanisms through which an information treatment operates
it is essential to measure a rich set of beliefs which capture the theoretical mechanisms that
may be at play. We first discuss how to circumvent issues related to numerical anchoring.
Second, we argue that measurement of beliefs about the provided information should be
more commonly used to better understand and interpret the effects of information.
Numerical anchoring An additional methodological concern for quantitative outcome
measures elicited after the information provision, such as posterior beliefs about the
statistic, is unconscious numerical anchoring. There are several best practices for alleviating
concerns about numerical anchoring. First, one can provide irrelevant numerical anchors
and test their effects on the posterior belief of interest in order to gauge the importance
of such anchoring (Cavallo et al., 2016a; Coibion et al., 2018b; Roth and Wohlfart, 2019).
Second, one should measure at least some quantitative beliefs on a scale that differs from
the scale on which the information is communicated. Third, one should also employ
qualitative measures of beliefs, which are naturally immune to numerical anchoring.
Follow-up surveys Follow-up surveys, conducted a few weeks after the initial infor-
mation intervention, are an important tool used to mitigate concerns about numerical
anchoring, which is a short-lived phenomenon.
Follow-up surveys also alleviate concerns about consistency bias in survey responses
(Falk and Zimmermann, 2012). Follow-up surveys to study whether information provision
has persistent effects on beliefs, preferences and behaviors are increasingly common and
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were pioneered by Kuziemko et al. (2015), Cavallo et al. (2016a) and Coppock (2016)
in the context of survey experiments. Usually follow-ups in the context of information
experiments take place one to eight weeks after the initial information provision. An
exception are Fehr et al. (2019b) whose follow-up takes place one year after the initial
information provision.
Measuring beliefs about the information Finally, in order to obtain a better understand-
ing of the effects of the information treatment, we think that researchers should measure
trust in and other beliefs about the provided information. For example, Haaland and Roth
(2019b) elicit a rich set of beliefs about the research evidence provided to respondents. Nat-
urally, such explicit questions may induce significant experimenter demand effects. One
way to mitigate concerns about such experimenter demand effects is to elicit incentivized
measures of willingness to pay for the information of interest (Fehr et al., 2019b; Haaland
and Roth, 2019a; Hjort et al., 2019).
Cross-learning Another recurring issue in information provision experiments is cross-
learning. Specifically, respondents may not only update beliefs about the object of interest,
but at the same time change their beliefs about other outcomes. For instance, Coibion et al.
(2019a) find that provision of information about inflation not only changes respondents’
inflation expectations but also their beliefs about GDP growth. On the one hand, such cross-
learning can be seen as a natural by-product of experimental changes in beliefs, as changes
in beliefs due to natural variation are similarly often correlated across variables. On the
other hand, cross-learning can complicate the interpretation of IV estimates exploiting
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randomized information provision, as such estimates are often compared to theoretical
benchmarks which do not account for cross-learning. One way to over-come the issue
of cross-learning is to hold fixed beliefs about other variables by providing the same
information about other variables to respondents in both control and treatment groups.
However, simultaneous provision of several pieces of information will arguably reduce
attention to the main piece of information and lead to a weaker first stage. In any case,
researchers should include measures for beliefs about other variables which could be
shifted by the treatment in their survey in order to be able to detect cross-learning and to
gauge its extent and implications.
6 Dealing with experimenter demand effects
One concern with information provision experiments are demand effects (de Quidt et al.,
2018; Mummolo and Peterson, 2019; Zizzo, 2010). While recent empirical evidence suggests
a limited quantitative importance of experimenter demand effects in the context of online
surveys (de Quidt et al., 2018; Mummolo and Peterson, 2019), it is still possible that in
some contexts treatment effects are confounded by experimenter demand effects as people
in the different treatment arms may make differential inference about the experimenter’s
expectations. In this section we outline best-practice recommendations to mitigate concerns
about experimenter demand effects.
Obfuscated follow-ups Haaland and Roth (2019a,b) propose the use of obfuscated
follow-ups to mitigate concerns about experimenter demand effects. Obfuscated follow-up
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surveys are follow-up studies with the same respondents as in the initial experiment, which
are presented as an independent study to participants. Since no treatment is administered
in the follow-up study, differential experimenter demand between the treatment and
control group is unlikely to be a concern unless respondents nonetheless realize that the
follow-up is connected to the main study. Haaland and Roth (2019a,b) take several steps to
hide the connection between their main study and their obfuscated follow-up study. First,
they collaborated with a market research company where respondents regularly receive
invitations to participate in surveys. The marketing company sent generic invitations that
only reveal information about pay and expected completion time. Second, they employed
two different consent forms for the two surveys. Third, to give the impression that the
follow-up is an independent study, they first ask respondents a series of questions about
their demographics. Fourth, to further obfuscate the purpose of the follow-up, they pose
questions about unrelated issues before asking any of the actual questions of interest.
Following the approach proposed by Haaland and Roth (2019a,b), Settele (2019) uses an
obfuscated follow-up survey in the context of attitudes towards affirmative action.
Anonymity Anonymity has been argued to be a powerful tool against experimenter
demand effects in experimental research (Hoffman et al., 1994). In the context of policy
preference experiments, researchers have recently relied on the use of anonymous online
petitions in order to mitigate concerns about experimenter demand effects (Grigorieff et al.,
2020). A commonly used additional tool are “list methods” which aim to veil the answers
of individual respondents and are increasingly applied throughout the social sciences
(Bursztyn et al., 2018; Chen and Yang, 2019; Coffman et al., 2016; Lergetporer et al., 2017).
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Incentivized outcomes Over the last few years researchers have started using incen-
tivized outcomes in the context of survey experiments. A commonly used approach is
to elicit incentivized donations to political organizations which capture specific policy
preferences (Bursztyn et al., 2019a; Grigorieff et al., 2020; Roth et al., 2019). Presumably,
demand effects should be lower in tasks in which real money is at stake.
Field outcomes A small number of studies manage to link information provision with
natural outcomes from the field, such as policy choices of politicians (Hjort et al., 2019),
campaign donations (Perez-Truglia and Cruces, 2016), voting behavior (Cruz et al., 2018;
Kendall et al., 2015) and canvassing activity using an online application (Hager et al.,
2019a,b), home sales (Bottan and Perez-Truglia, 2020) or stock trading choices of retail
investors (Laudenbach et al., 2020). The key advantage of these studies is that they provide
unobtrusive behavioral outcome data from a natural setting. Experimenter demand effects
are of no concern in many of these natural settings as respondents are often not aware of
the fact that they are part of an experiment. In general, given that decisions in the field
involve much higher stakes than survey responses, it is unlikely that changes in these
outcomes reflect demand effects.
Neutral framing How should researchers frame the information treatments? One way
to minimize the relevance of experimenter demand effects is to adopt a neutral framing
of the experimental instructions. The neutral framing of instructions usually makes the
purpose of the experiment less transparent and draws less attention of respondents to the
expectations and wishes of the experimenter.
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Obfuscated information treatments One way to mitigate experimenter demand effects
is to obfuscate the information treatments. In others words, researchers can try to obfuscate
the purpose of the study by providing respondents with additional pieces of information,
which are irrelevant, or by giving respondents tasks that give the impression that the
purpose of the study is completely unrelated to the actual goal. One possibility is to give
people an unrelated reason for why they receive the information of interest. For instance,
researchers could tell respondents that they need to proofread or summarize pieces of
information. For an example in the context of immigration attitudes, see Facchini et al.
(2016). Furthermore, in experiments in which the researcher elicits incentivized prior
beliefs, the purpose of the information treatment may be naturally concealed by framing
the information treatment as feedback on whether the respondent’s answer qualified for
an extra payment.
Demand treatments de Quidt et al. (2018) propose the use of demand treatments in
order to measure the sensitivity of behavior and self-reports with respect to explicit
signals about the experimenter’s expectations. For example, they tell respondents that
they “expect that participants who are shown these instructions” will act in a particular
way. The idea behind their approach is that one can use explicit signals of experimenters’
wishes in order to bound the natural action. Roth and Wohlfart (2019) and Mummolo
and Peterson (2019) apply demand treatments in the context of survey experiments on
macroeconomic expectations and in political science, respectively, and confirm the finding
that responsiveness to demand effects is quite moderate.
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Measuring beliefs about the study purpose Many research studies in economics and
psychology measure beliefs about the study purpose. Demand effects are less likely a
concern in an experiment or survey if participants cannot identify the intent of the study
(Allcott and Taubinsky, 2015). Allcott and Taubinsky (2015) measure perceptions of study
intent, and show that that there is strong dispersion in perceived intent within treatment
groups, suggesting that it is unclear in which way demand effects might affect behavior.
Heterogeneity by self-monitoring scale Allcott and Taubinsky (2015) argue that if de-
mand effects are driving behavior in experiments, then they should be more pronounced
for respondents who are more able to detect the intent of the study and are more willing to
change their choices given the experimenter’s intent. Allcott and Taubinsky (2015) employ
the self-monitoring scale by Snyder (1974), and find no evidence that self-monitoring
ability moderates the treatment effect.
Summary Overall, demand effects have been shown to be of limited quantitative impor-
tance in online experiments (de Quidt et al., 2018). However, the importance of demand
effects will vary a lot across settings. We believe that they can be a concern particularly
in sensitive domains and are probably less important in less charged domains such as
macroeconomic expectation formation. It is best practice to include some of the above
outlined checks, especially in sensitive domains.
7 Samples
We provide an overview of commonly used samples with a particular focus on the US.
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7.1 Online panels
We now discuss the advantages and disadvantages of three different types of online
samples that are commonly used for conducting information provision experiments: (i)
probability-based samples, (ii) online panels representative in terms of observables, and
(iii) online labor markets, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Probability-based samples The most representative samples are probability-based pan-
els. The idea behind probability-based samples is that respondents should have a known,
non-zero probability of being recruited to the panel. Probability-based samples have the
clear advantage that they come with sampling weights, which allows researchers to make
more externally valid inferences about the whole population with a known sampling error.
The disadvantages of probability-based samples are that they are typically much costlier
than convenience samples and that they typically offer the least degree of flexibility in
survey design and implementation.
In the United States, a widely used probability-based panel is AmeriSpeak by NORC at
The University of Chicago. The panel uses NORC’s National Frame, which is designed to
provide at least 97 percent sample coverage of the US population. The NORC National
Frame is used for several landmark studies in the US, including the General Social Survey,
which is one of the most frequently analyzed data sets in the social sciences. Other
probability-based samples of the US population open to academic researchers include
The RAND American Life Panel, the Understanding America Study at the University of
Southern California, and the Ipsos KnowledgePanel (formerly administered by GfK).
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Representative online panels The second type of available online sample provide sam-
ples that are representative in terms of observables. These survey providers rely on
convenience samples where participants typically sign up to join the panel in exchange
for monetary rewards. The main advantages of these panels is that the samples can be
made representative in terms of some important observable characteristics, such as age,
income, race, and gender, and are much more affordable than probability-based panels.
Furthermore, they allow for the use of obfuscated follow-up studies. The main disadvan-
tage of these panels is that inferences may be less externally valid and there is a concern
that respondents who self-select into online panels are very different from the broader
population. However, using German data Grewenig et al. (2018) show that the online and
the offline population hardly differ in terms of survey responses in the context of political
views and opinions, once the survey method and observable respondent characteristics are
controlled for. Two large providers that are widely used in the social sciences are Dynata
(formerly Research Now and Survey Sampling International) and Luc.id (Wood and Porter,
2019).
Coppock and McClellan (2019) find that samples from Lucid score similarly to the
American National Election Study’s (ANES) on the Big-5 personality inventory, show
similar levels of political knowledge, and recover framing effects similar to the ones
observed in a probability-based sample (the General Social Survey). Haaland and Roth
(2019a) find similar experimental results using a sample from a representative online
panel provider and a probability-based sample. Other comparable providers are YouGov,
Respondi, and the Qualtrics panel.
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Amazon Mechanical Turk The third type of available online sample are online labor
markets, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk, which are widely used in the social sciences
and economics (Kuziemko et al., 2015). Coppock (2018) conducts 15 replication experi-
ments and finds a very high degree of replicability of survey experiments in the field of
political science with MTurk as compared to nationally representative samples. Horton
et al. (2011) replicates several well-known lab experiments using MTurk, concluding that
online experiments on MTurk are just as valid as traditional physical lab experiments.
However, recent studies suggest that data quality on MTurk has been declining over time,
partly through the proliferation of bots (automated computer programs) and non-serious
respondents, which threatens the data quality on the platform if sensible screening pro-
cedures are not implemented (Ahler et al., 2019; Chmielewski and Kucker, 2019). To
maximize data quality on MTurk, one should only allow workers that have completed a
large number of previous tasks with a high completion rate. Furthermore, in the actual
survey, one should include fraud detection tools to rule out bots, such as a CAPTCHA at
the beginning of the survey. While MTurk is less representative than most other survey
platforms, the platform has some important advantages. First, data collection speed is
typically very fast and it offers researchers maximum flexibility in terms of research design.
Second, since users sign up for MTurk with their own credit card, it is also possible to
incentivize respondents with real money (respondents from more representative panel
platforms are typically paid in panel currencies that can be converted into gift vouchers).
Third, it is possible to conduct follow-up studies with low attrition rates (Grigorieff et al.,
2020).
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7.2 Measuring attention in online surveys
Screeners One concern in online surveys is that respondents are inattentive and speed
through the surveys (Krosnick, 1991). We recommend using multiple attention checks
in online surveys. Recent research suggests that the inclusion of attention checks does
not affect estimated treatment effects, but it allows researchers to study how measured
attention affects behavior (Berinsky et al., 2014; Kane and Barabas, 2019). One example of
an attention screener is the following:
The next question is about the following problem. In questionnaires like ours,
sometimes there are participants who do not carefully read the questions and
just quickly click through the survey. This means that there are a lot of random
answers which compromise the results of research studies. To show that you
read our questions carefully, please enter turquoise as your answer to the next
question. What is your favorite color?
There are at least two features of attention checks that we consider important: first, it is
important for attention checks to explain to participants why researchers use these attention
checks. This explanation can mitigate concerns about negative emotional reactions to the
use of attention checks on the part of participants. Second, we think that attention checks
should be simple to understand and should not be too cognitively demanding. Therefore,
having an unambiguous and easy-to-understand question which is not too cognitively
challenging is important. For an excellent review on attention checks, see Berinsky et al.
(2014).
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Open-ended questions Bots have been identified as a threat to online surveys. On top
of standard bot protections, such as CAPTCHAS, we recommend using at least two open-
ended questions in the survey, e.g. to inquire about feedback about the survey or to ask
about the study purpose. These open-ended questions are a useful tool to assess data
quality and to identify bots that may provide identical (and/or non-sensical) responses to
different open-ended questions.
8 Typical effect sizes and recommended sample sizes
In this section, we briefly discuss typical effect sizes from information provision experi-
ments.
Learning rates Typical information experiments usually measure belief updating using
either qualitative or quantitative questions. In the context of quantitative beliefs, papers
usually calculate learning rates. To calculate such learning rates, we require both prior
and posterior beliefs in order to quantify updating. Moreover, typically we observe both a
treatment group which receives information and a control group, which does not receive
any information. To quantify the extent to which the respondents update their beliefs
towards the signal they receive during the information treatment one can estimate the
following specification:
Updatingi = β0 + β1TreatmentiPerc.-gapi + β2Treatmenti + β3Perc.-gapi + εi
where Updatingi is defined as the difference between the respondent’s posterior and
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prior about the quantity of interest. The perception gap, Perc.-gapi, is the difference
between the true signal and the respondent’s prior belief about the signal. The key
coefficient of interest, β1, captures the extent of belief updating toward the provided signal
among respondents in the treatment group, on top of any updating that also happens for
respondents in the control group. β2 captures the average treatment effect on respondents’
beliefs to the extent it does not depend on individual priors. β3 measures changes in
beliefs, which depend on the perception gap in the control group.
To give a sense of effect sizes for learning rates, we discuss the estimated learning rates
of a few selected papers. Armantier et al. (2016) find a learning rate of 0.393 for 1-year
inflation forecasts in response to a professional forecast. Armona et al. (2019) estimate
an instantaneous learning rate of 0.18 for house price growth in response to information
about past house price growth. In a 2 month follow-up, they estimate a learning rate of
0.13, indicating a high degree of persistence. Roth and Wohlfart (2019) estimate a learning
rate of 0.318 for recession expectation in response to a professional forecast. In a two
week follow-up they document a learning rate of 0.129, indicating a modest degree of
persistence. Taken together, these papers document that people learn from the information
provided, and that effects become weaker over time.
Effect sizes on beliefs versus preferences Effect sizes on self-reported attitudes and
behavioral measures are typically much smaller in magnitude than effect sizes on belief
updating in response to information treatments. For instance, Alesina et al. (2018c) employ
an information treatment to generate exogenous variation in perceptions of social mobility.
While perceptions about the probability of remaining in the bottom quintile of the income
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distribution increase by 9.7 percentage points—thus making treated respondents substan-
tially more pessimistic about the social mobility proces—the authors find essentially no
average impact on policy preferences. Similarly, an experiment by Kuziemko et al. (2015)
provides respondents with accurate information about the income distribution. They find
a large effect on beliefs about income inequality: treated respondents are 12 percentage
points more likely to believe that income inequality has increased. By contrast, policy
preferences are largely unaffected by the treatment. Haaland and Roth (2019b) report
results from an experiment where effect sizes on beliefs and preferences are quite similar
in magnitude. Specifically, they provide respondents with research evidence showing no
adverse labor market impacts of low-skilled immigration. Treated respondents become
17.1 percent of a standard deviation more more optimistic about the labor market im-
pacts of low-skilled immigrants and 14.1 percent of a standard deviation more in favor of
low-skilled immigration.6
Behavioral elasticities One way to illustrate effect sizes is to express findings in terms
of behavioral elasticities. In this approach researchers instrument the endogenous belief
of interest with the information treatment. For example, Cullen and Perez-Truglia (2018)
find that increasing the perceived manager salary by 10% would increase the number of
hours worked by 1.5%. Bottan and Perez-Truglia (2020) find that a 1 percentage point
increase in home price expectations reduces the probability of selling within 6 months by
2.45 percentage points. Roth and Wohlfart (2019) find that a 10 percentage point increase in
6It is worth noting that Nyhan and Reifler (2010) find that corrections of beliefs frequently fail to reduce
misperceptions among the targeted ideological group. Indeed, Nyhan and Reifler (2010) document several
instances of a “backfire effect” in which corrections actually increase misperceptions among the group in
question.
35
the perceived likelihood of a recession leads to a decrease in planned consumption growth
by 13 percent of a standard deviation. The key advantage of this approach is that it makes
it easier to compare results across settings. The key disadvantage is that the exclusion
restriction needed for such an approach may not hold as the information provided may
change several beliefs simultaneously.
Sample sizes In light of the rather small or moderate effect sizes on preference measures
typically observed in information provision experiments, we recommend employing rela-
tively large samples. Given that typical effects are usually around 15 percent of a standard
deviation, and usually lower in the subsequent follow-up surveys, we recommend employ-
ing a sample size of at least 700 respondents per treatment arm of interest. Furthermore,
since many information experiments yield small or modest effects, it is important to have
relatively large samples in order to identify a precise null finding. Naturally, the required
sample size will vary greatly across different contexts and needs to be tailored accordingly.
9 Concluding remarks
Our review provides an overview of methods used to study the causal effect of information
on beliefs, behaviors and preferences. Our review outlined key measurement challenges
and issues surrounding the measurement and the experimental manipulation of beliefs.
The key focus of the review centers on methods to deal with (i) the design of information
treatments, and (ii) undesirable side effects arising from information treatments, such as
numerical anchoring and experimenter demand effects.
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Some of the key open questions in this literature surround the exact mechanisms
through which information affects beliefs and behaviors. For example, the role of attention
and memory in information provision experiments is not well-understood.7 New methods
which shed more detailed light on the role of attention will thus likely be at the center of
future research in this area.
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